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EXPANDING PATENT LAW’S 
 CUSTOMER SUIT EXCEPTION  
 
 
Brian J. Love* 
James C. Yoon† 
 
93 Boston University Law Review (forthcoming 2013) 
 
Abstract: Recent years have seen a marked increase in patent suits filed 
primarily for nuisance value. Non-practicing patent holders like Innovatio, 
Lodsys, PACid, and many others have collectively sued thousands of 
alleged patent infringers in cases that generally settle for less than the cost 
of mounting even the slightest defense. Suits like these overwhelming 
target the numerous resellers and end users of allegedly infringing 
products, rather than the accused products’ original manufacturer. More 
individual defendants means more lawyers, more discovery, and, thus, 
more litigation costs to inflate settlement amounts. With legislative reform 
unlikely at present, doctrinal solutions to this problem are needed now 
more than ever. This article proposes one candidate: the customer suit 
exception. This doctrine allows courts to stay patent suits filed against 
“customer” defendants pending the outcome of litigation between the 
patentee and the accused technology’s manufacturer.  Doing so drastically 
reduces patentees’ ability to impose litigation costs and, moreover, hands 
the reins of defense to the party best suited to challenge and value the 
patent-in-suit.  Unfortunately, case law applying the exception has become 
increasingly rigid over time and, today, is incredibly difficult to satisfy.  
This article explores the history and evolution of the customer suit 
exception, explains why the doctrine is so rarely invoked and applied, and 
argues that courts should stay customer suits more frequently in order to 
promote litigation outcomes that reflect the value of asserted patents, not 
the cost of defense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Exploitation of inefficiencies in the patent system may be at an all-time 
high.  Suits filed by non-practicing entities (NPEs)—companies that 
acquire patents solely to license them, not to protect products1—are on the 
rise.2  So are the size of litigation costs,3 settlement amounts, and potential 
damages awards4 that innovators who actually commercialize technology 
face as a result of these suits.   
                                                 
1 The NPE—or patent “troll”—ecosystem is complex.  See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., 
Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (dividing NPE patentholders into twelve categories, rather 
than grouping all NPEs together under the rubric of “troll”).  Some commentators have 
developed alternative terminology intended to single out a subset of “trollish” NPEs.  
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) (defining “patent 
assertion entity” (PAE) as an entity that uses patents primarily to obtain license fees 
rather than to support the development or transfer of technology); Sara Jeruss et al., The 
America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2012) (using the similar term “patent monetization 
entity” (PME)).  In this paper, we primarily discuss a subset of NPEs defined by 
behavior—namely, a penchant for filing suits primarily for nuisance value—rather than 
by their corporate structure or the provenance of their patents.    
2 See Jeruss, et al., supra note 1, at 365 (finding, in a study of 100 patent suits filed each 
year from 2007 to 2011, that the percentage attributable to NPEs was roughly 22% in 
2007, 27% in 2008, 33% in 2009, 30% in 2010, and 40% in 2011); Colleen V. Chien, 
Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of 
High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1604 (2009) (finding, in a study of 2,300 
high-tech patent suits filed between 2000 and 2008, that NPEs filed 10% of all suits 
initiated between 2000-2001, 16% between 2002-2003, 16% between 2004-2005, and 
20% between 2006-2008). 
3 According to a survey of law firms conducted by the American Intellectual Property 
Law Association, median patent litigation costs roughly doubled between 2001 and 2009, 
and doubled again between 2009 and 2011.  Compare AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2001, at 85 (reporting 
that in cases with $25 million or more potentially at stake the median cost per party from 
pleadings through discovery was $1.5 million) with AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009, at I-129 (reporting that the 
same figure had increased to $3 million in costs) and AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 at I-155-56 
(reporting that it increased again to $6 million).  See also Matt Miller, Are You in Good 
Hands When IP Mayhem Strikes, DISCOVER READY, June 5, 2012, available at 
http://discoverready.com/blog/are-you-in-good-hands-when-ip-mayhem-strikes/ (reporting 
that the cost of patent litigation has increased about 48% increase since 2001). 
4 Between 2006 and 2010, the median NPE damages award was more than twice as large 
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Satisfactory solutions to this problem have so far proven illusory, or at 
least politically unpalatable.5  Patent reform legislation enacted in 2011 
has made, at best, superficial progress in stemming the tide of NPE 
litigation.6  And additional, meaningful legislative reform doesn’t appear 
                                                                                                                            
litigation-study.pdf (finding that the median NPE award was $6.9 million and the median 
practicing-patentee award was $3.4 million).  Between 1995 and 2000, the median NPE 
damages award was 23% larger than the median award to practicing-companies.  Id.  
2012 was the most profitable year to date for large, publicly-traded NPE Acacia Research 
Corporation.  Press Release, Acacia Research Corp. (Feb. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.acaciaresearch.com/pr/0221134thqtrfinancials2012.pdf. 
5 Recently proposed legislation creating a fee-shifting scheme to deter frivolous NPE suits 
asserting high-tech patents died in committee without a public hearing.  Saving High-
Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2012, H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. 
(2012), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6245.  Few believe it 
ever had a legitimate chance of becoming law.  See, e.g., Lisa Schuchman, Finding 




(reporting that a panel of experts believed the bill was “unlikely to pass”).  Moreover, 
though patent reform legislation was enacted in 2011, it passed congressional scrutiny 
only after virtually all serious reforms were stripped from the bill.  See, e.g., Joe Mullin, 
Senate Passes Patent Reform, After Stripping Out All Controversial Measures, 
PAIDCONTENT, March 10, 2011, at http://paidcontent.org/2011/03/10/419-senate-passes-
patent-reform-after-stripping-out-all-controversial-measu/.   
6 Under section 299 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), patentees may no 
longer sue multiple, unrelated defendants in a single patent suit.  35 U.S.C. § 299 
(“[P]arties that are accused infringers may be joined in one action as defendants . . . only 
if . . . questions of fact common to all defendants . . . will arise . . . . [and] infringers 
may not be joined in one action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their 
actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each have infringed the 
patent or patents in suit.”).  Hopes that this change in law would increase the cost of 
litigation for NPEs, and thereby reduce the quantity of NPE infringement claims, have so 
far proven unfounded.  NPEs now file multiple identical suits, rather one suit with 
multiple defendants.  See, e.g., Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 2012 
WL 3307942 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012) (noting a rise in “serially file[d] multiple single-
defendant (or defendant group) cases involving the same underlying patents”); Charles R. 
Macedo et al., AIA’s Impact On Multidefendant Patent Litigation: Part 2, Law360.com 
(Oct. 26, 2012), at http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/387458/aia-s-impact-on-
multidefendant-patent-litigation-part-2 (noting that NPEs are exploring creative avenues 
to circumvent AIA joinder rules, including filing multiple nearly-identical complaints).  
As a result, the new joinder rules have markedly increased the number of patent suits 
with little change at all in the quantity of individual companies accused of infringement.  
See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation at the Dec. 10, 2012 
D.O.J./F.T.C. Hearing on PAEs, 24, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (reporting that the number 
of NPE-filed suits has risen sharply since the AIA’s enactment, while the number of 
  
 
Draft 15-Mar-13 4 
likely at present because, though there is widespread agreement that 
something should be done, industry factions cannot agree on what should 
be done and at whose expense.7   
Much of the disagreement over the “patent troll” problem is 
definitional.  NPEs come in various shapes and sizes, 8 and not all are 
widely viewed as bad actors. 9   One thing that isn’t seriously debated, 
however, is the utility of patentholders that specialize in nuisance-value 
patent litigation.  No one champions these “bottom feeders”10 of the NPE 
                                                                                                                            
accused infringers has remained roughly similar); Maya M. Eckstein, et al., The 
(Unintended) Consequences of the AIA Joinder Provision § IV.D.i, AIPLA Spring 
Meeting, Austin, Tex., May 10-12, 2012, at 
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/papers/SM/2012_Spring/Documents/2012SM
-Materials/Eckstein_Paper.pdf (showing a 64% increase in the rate of patent litigation 
filings in all district courts post-AIA). 
7  Even defenders of the NPE business model generally agree that at least some 
patentholders abuse the system.  See Nathan Myhrvold, Inventors Have Rights, Too!, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at A14 (“Perhaps the biggest myth is . . . ‘patent trolls’ . . . 
who supposedly manipulate the patent system in a shady way.  It does happen . . . . A 
tiny minority of patent suits are due to bad actors, but it’s hardly a crisis.”); Michael C. 
Smith, “Patent Pirates” Only Exist in Neverland, TEX. LAWYER, Oct. 11, 2004 
(acknowledging that “patent litigation can price small defendants out of being able to 
defend themselves on the merits”); Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for 
Imaginary Creatures: A Comments Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 
17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 166 (2007) (arguing that “[i]nstead of hindering legitimate 
intellectual property businesses, the courts and legislature should focus on the main 
problem with patent litigation—patent quality”).  
8  For example, though universities, failed startups, individual inventors, and industry 
consortia are NPEs strictly speaking, each group has unique motivations and 
sophistication.  Allison, et. al., supra note 1, at 2. 
9 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008) (arguing that universities are not “trolls”); Chien, 
Of Trolls, supra note 2, at 1578 (arguing that individual inventors also fall outside the 
scope of patentees that deserve the label “troll”); Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, 
Remarks at the Eastern District of Texas Judicial Conference on the State of Patent 
Litigation (Sep. 27, 2011) (“[T]he NPE designation sweeps in some unintended ‘culprits’ 
like universities and research clinics and can also extend to almost every corporation and 
business because they practice only a fraction of their patent portfolio.”).  
10 David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 
ALA. L. REV. 335, 369 (2012) (describing firms that are at the “bottom” of the 
contingent fee market); see also Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 21 (2003) (testimony of David Simon) (defining patent trolls as 
“patent system bottom feeders” who buy “improvidently-granted patents from distressed 
companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses”). 
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ecosystem: a class of patentees that overwhelmingly acquire old, 11 
extremely weak 12  patents and assert them against the numerous, 
unsophisticated purchasers (rather than manufacturers) of allegedly 
infringing products in suits that typically settle for less than defendants’ 
anticipated litigation costs.    
Recent years have seen a spike in high profile patent assertion of this 
sort.  In the last two years, NPE Innovatio has asserted its patent rights—
rights the company alleges cover any use of a Wi-Fi network—against 
hundreds of small businesses like coffee shops and hotels that offer 
wireless network access to patrons,13 invariably offering to settle for an 
amount far below the cost of mounting even the slightest defense. 14  
Another patent-holder, Lodsys, has sued scores of companies, asserting 
patents allegedly covering (among other things) mobile “apps” that enable 
users to make purchases on mobile devices,15 each time offering to settle 
for running royalties substantially below those at stake in a typical patent 
suit. 16   Other examples abound.  Operating through multiple shell 
                                                 
11 See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent 
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV.  
(forthcoming 2013) (finding that NPEs are responsible for about two-thirds of all patent 
suits and four-fifths of all infringement claims litigated within the last three years of the 
asserted patent’s term). 
12  See John R. Allison, et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent 
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 689, 694 (2011) (finding that between 2000 and 2010, NPEs 
that asserted the same patent in eight or more cases settled almost 90% of the time and, 
when forced to litigate to a judgment, lost more than 90% of the time). 
13 In addition, Innovatio has threatened thousands more with suit.  Amended Complaint at 
19, Cisco Systems Inc. v. Innovatio IP Ventures LLC, No. 1:11cv09309 (N.D. Ill. filed 
Dec 28, 2011) (“Innovatio has sent more than 8,000 threatening letters to licensing 
targets [end users of Wi-Fi technology] in all 50 states”); Ashby Jones, Cisco Calls 
Patent Trolls Racketeers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324073504578113082258844080.html. 
14 Gregory Thomas, Innovatio’s Infringement Suit Rampage Expands to Corporate Hotels, 
The Patent Examiner, Sept. 30, 2011, http://patentexaminer.org/2011/09/innovatios-
infringement-suit-rampage-expands-to-corporate-hotels (noting that Innovatio demands a 
few thousand dollars to settle when the typical patent suit settles for six- or seven-figure 
dollar amounts).  
15 Lodsys - Piling It On, But To What Purpose, GROKLAW, July 22, 2011, 
http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20110722082612424 (noting that as of July 
2011 Lodsys had asserted its patents against 40 entities). 
16 David Ruddock, Patent Trolls: What Is Lodsys Actually Asking App Developers To Pay? 
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companies, NPE Project Paperless has threatened to sue an untold number 
of small offices for infringing patents that allegedly cover copiers 
equipped to email scanned files.17  Personal Audio has similarly threatened 
end users of podcasting software.18  PACid has sued more than 50 retailers 
that sell products allegedly infringing patent rights to data encryption 
technology.19  And several NPEs, including E-Data,20 Soverain Software,21 
and Clear with Computers,22 have collectively sued well over one hundred 
online retailers for infringing patents that allegedly cover some aspect of 
e-commerce.  In fact, small companies—not tech giants—are the 
predominant targets of NPE lawsuits.23 
Though enabled by many factors, 24  nuisance value patent assertion 
wouldn’t be possible without a large population of potential defendants.25  
                                                                                                                            
app-developers-to-pay-you-might-be-surprised (noting that Lodsys demands only 0.575% 
in royalties while royalties in a typical patent case fall between one and four percent). 
17 See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—For Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA, 
Jan. 2, 2013, at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-
using-scanners/. 
18
 See, e.g., Julie Samuels, Podcasting Community Faces Patent Troll Threat; EFF Wants 
to Help, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Feb. 5, 2013, at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/podcasting-community-faces-patent-troll-threat-eff-
wants-help (“So far, Personal Audio has sued some pretty high-profile and beloved 
podcasts, like the Adam Carolla Show and HowStuffWorks. It also sent its threatening 
letters demanding a license to numerous podcasters, like Majority Report’s Sam Seder”). 
19  See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Best Buy, Dozens More Sued Over Encryption Patents, 
IPINVESTMENTS GROUP, July 28, 2010, at 
http://ipinvestmentsgroup.com/index_files/PACid-7.28.2010.pdf. 
20  See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual 
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 517 (2003) (noting that E-Data, a company 
that “owns a patent which arguably covers financial transactions on the Internet,” 
reportedly sent demand letters to 75,000 alleged infringers before suing forty-one 
companies for patent infringement).  
21 See, e.g., Joe Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” Patent and Saved 
Online Retail, ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 27, 2013, at http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/01/how-newegg-crushed-the-shopping-cart-patent-and-saved-online-retail/. 
22  See, e.g., John S. Pratt & Bonnie M. Grant, Beware the Trolls: Explorers or 
Buccaneers, PATENT WORLD, Nov. 2008, at 18 (noting that Clear with Computers sued 
47 defendants in one suit alone). 
23  Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls (working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146251 (finding that 55% of 
companies sued by NPEs have annual gross revenues below $10 million). 
24 The nuisance-value troll business model thrives in the U.S. for a number of reasons.  
For one, unlike much of the world, the U.S. court system generally does not require the 
party who lost a lawsuit to pay the winner’s legal fees as a matter of course.  See, e.g., 
John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's 
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993).  Moreover, though the law permits 
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Fortunately for NPEs, the Patent Act provides a ready supply.  Under 
section 271(a), any entity that “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells” 
subject matter covered by a patent claim is an infringer.26  Patentholders, 
thus, generally have the option to sue anywhere on the supply chain, from 
the original manufacturer of the infringing product all the way down to the 
retailer or end-user.  Patentholders who aim lower on the supply chain 
generally can sue more individual parties and, thus, impose more litigation 
costs. 27   For patentholders whose rights are worth relatively little 
                                                                                                                            
them to do so, courts have proven exceedingly reluctant to sanction patentees for bringing 
arguably “frivolous” or “exceptional” lawsuits.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1530 (2001) (“Unfortunately, 
the patent law makes it very difficult for a prevailing defendant to obtain an award of 
attorney's fees. The statute requires the case to be ‘exceptional.’”).  Courts’ reluctance to 
sanction patentees likely stems from the fact that it is incredibly difficult to determine the 
scope of patent claims and, thus, pronounce any given infringement allegation objectively 
baseless.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction 
More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (finding that the Federal 
Circuit reversed 34.5% of district court claim construction rulings appealed between 
1996 and 2003). See also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s 
Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (reporting 
similar numbers).  
25 From a patent holder’s perspective, it is economically worthwhile to bring suit if the 
“expected” value of litigation is greater than its “expected” litigation costs.  In suits 
involving “weak” or “nuisance” patents, patent holders must minimize the expected costs 
of litigation in order to maximize the expected value of litigation.  See Ranganath 
Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economical Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 163, 165-166 (2008). One way patent 
holders minimize expected litigation costs by using contingency fee arrangements. Id. at 
166.  Another way patentholders minimize expected litigation costs per defendant is by 
suing a large number of defendants together in the same action.  Id. at 167-168 (noting 
that from the standpoint of a nuisance patent plaintiff, many litigation costs are 
substantially the same whether there is one defendant or many).  
26 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).  Unlike general tort law, patent law does not permit accused 
infringers to implead those who might be jointly and severally liable for the infringement.  
See Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 98 
(2011) (“Under tort law’s theory of contribution, when one party is sued, it can implead 
other parties that may be jointly and severally liable and ask that they pay their fair share 
of any judgment. Although contribution theory has spread to numerous areas of the law, 
patent law is not among them. Thus, when a manufacturer is sued for patent infringement, 
it cannot seek contribution from the component supplier that included the patented 
technology in its component.”).   
27 Each customer defendant independently bears the risk of litigation.  The defendant’s 
expected value of litigation is a negative cost, which can be calculated in the following 
manner: cost = attorney fees + case costs + indirect employee costs + (probability of 
patent holder win * judgment for patent holder).  Richard A. Kamprath, Gaming the 
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compared to the costs of litigation—roughly between $1 to $3 million for 
even suits of modest complexity28—serial nuisance filings against resellers 
or users quickly becomes more profitable than litigating on the merits 
against the original manufacturer. 
Not even manufacturers, who at first blush may seem like beneficiaries 
of this practice, like the current state of affairs.  Widespread use of 
indemnification agreements means that manufacturers often remain on the 
hook for their customers’ settlements.29  Manufacturers also legitimately 
fear loss of good will with existing customers and lost business in the 
future if they fail to stand up for customers accused of infringement.  
Cisco, Motorola, and Netgear jumped into the fray with Innovatio,30 and 
Apple fought Lodsys.31  But neither company was able to stop its NPE 
adversary from continuing to file suits, continuing to rack up alleged 
infringers’ legal bills, and continuing to accept settlement checks from 
defendants hoping to triage their budgets.32 
This unfortunate reality raises the common sense question: Shouldn’t 
patent law incorporate some mechanism permitting companies higher in 
                                                                                                                            
Patent System: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation Economics and Possible Solutions, at 
*23 (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577906.  A patent defendant 
will pay litigation costs no matter what the outcome of the patent lawsuit, and in addition 
may pay damages.  This is a strong incentive to settle the case as early as possible – 
without regard to the merits of the underlying case.  Id. at *23-24. 
28  See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at I-155-56. 
29  See Virginia DeMarchi, Contractual Indemnity Obligations for Patent Infringement 
Claims, A.B.A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION, vol. 21, no. 3 (Spring 2010), at 1 
(“indemnity provisions allocating the risk of infringement of intellectual property rights 
are increasingly common in commercial agreements”); MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN ET AL., 
DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS § 2.01 (2013). 
30  Mike Masnick, Cisco, Motorola, Netgear Team Up To Expose Wifi Patent Bully, 
TECHDIRT, Oct. 9, 2012, at http://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/?company=innovatio. 
31  Julie Samuels, Apple Steps Into Lodsys Litigation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, June 10, 2011, at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/06/apple-steps-
lodsys-litigation. 
32 See, e.g., Jeff John Roberts, Apple Scourge Lodsys Continues Patent Rampage Against 
Developers, Corporations, GIGAOM, May 22, 2012, at 
http://gigaom.com/2012/05/22/apple-scourge-lodsys-continues-patent-rampage-against-
developers-corporations (noting that Lodsys continued to offer “licensing solutions” to 
small app makers even after Apple’s intervention); Docket Entry No. 185, Innovatio IP 
Ventures, LLC vs. ABP Corp., No. 1:11-cv-01638 (N.D. Ill.) (denying as moot 
defendants’ motion to stay under the customer suit exception because the instant had been 
consolidated with ten others).  
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the supply chain to step in and stem the tide of patent filings against their 
customers?  Unbeknownst to many,33 patent law already does.   
Under the co-called “customer suit exception,” courts can stay 
litigation filed against a customer until after the resolution of a later-filed 
declaratory judgment action initiated by the accused product’s 
manufacturer.  The doctrine recognizes that it is the manufacturer, not a 
purchaser or mere user of technology, who is the “true party in interest” 
when that technology stands accused of patent infringement. 34   Unlike 
customers and end-users who frequently view patent suits as one-off 
affairs, manufacturers are often in a financial position to fight would-be 
nuisance suits to adjudication. 35   Also, compared to customers, 
manufacturers have a relative advantage litigating patent suits because they 
generally have greater knowledge of the industry, the prior art, and the 
patented invention’s value.36   
Unfortunately, parties rarely invoke the doctrine and courts apply it, if 
at all, very narrowly.  As a result, the customer suit exception has long 
existed in a state of relative disuse.  Since the 1960s, the doctrine has been 
raised in fewer than seventy cases total, and has been applied in just 
nineteen.37  The Federal Circuit has discussed the doctrine just five times 
in the last thirty year, and has affirmed its application only once.38  
                                                 
33 The doctrine is so obscure it has apparently never been the subject of a single law 
review article. 
34 Rates Tech., Inc. v. New York Tel. Co., 1995 WL 438954 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1995).  
35 See infra, Part II.A. 
36 See infra, Parts II.B-II.C. 
37 Customer Suit Exception Dataset (on file with the authors) [Note: Cases could be cited 
in an Appendix, instead].  Even this modest figure is inflated by numerous cases in which 
the exception was raised erroneously (or at least hopelessly).  See, e.g., Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc. v. S3 Graphics Co., Ltd., No. No. 11–CV-965, 2011 WL 5402667, at *2 
(D. Del. Nov. 8, 2011) (declining to stay a “nearly-completed ITC [customer] action in 
favor of a newly-filed district court [manufacturer] action”); Edizone, LLC v. Schering-
Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc., No. No. 10–CV–855, 2011 WL 1559944 (D. Utah Apr. 
25, 2011) (declining to apply the customer suit exception when the manufacturer was 
already a party in the first-filed action); AG Leader Tech., Inc. v. NTech Indus. Inc., 
574 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (declining to apply the exception when the 
manufacturer’s suit was the first-filed suit); Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., No. 08-CV-0279, 2008 WL 3472181 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2008) (declining to 
apply the exception when the manufacturer’s suit was the first-filed suit).   
38 Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming application of 
the customer suit exception); Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. 
Toshiba Am. Info. Sys. Inc., 297 F. App’x 970 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that partially 
staying the first-filed action was not in the interest of efficiency); Kahn v. Gen. Motors 
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This article sheds new light on the rarely-used doctrine, explains why 
it is so rarely invoked and applied, and argues that courts should stay 
customer suits more frequently in order to promote litigation outcomes 
that reflect the value of asserted patents, not the cost of defense.  Part I 
sets forth the doctrine underlying the customer suit exception and explains 
why parties so rarely raise it and courts so rarely apply it.  Part II explains 
why it is advantageous for manufacturers, rather than purchasers or users, 
of allegedly infringing products to defend against patent suits.  Finally, 
Part III proposes reforms to the customer suit exception that, if 
implemented, would permit manufacturers to take charge of suits filed 
against their legions of customers. 
 
I. THE CUSTOMER SUIT EXCEPTION 
 
Courts have inherent power to stay overlapping litigation for the sake 
of judicial economy.39  In carrying out this power, courts generally permit 
the suit filed first in time to proceed and stay related suits that were 
subsequently filed.40  Though the general practice of staying duplicative 
litigation obviously advances policy goals like efficiency and comity, 41 
                                                                                                                            
Corp., 889 F.2d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reversing application of the customer suit 
exception because the second-filed action would not resolve all issues between the 
parties); see also Spread Spectrum Screening LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 657 F.3d 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that an order to stay was not an appealable interlocutory 
order, in part, because the district court did not apply the customer suit exception); Tegic 
Commc’n Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (holding that, on the facts of the case, that the customer suit exception “does 
not override the immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment”). 
39 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is 
incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on 
its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigant.”). 
40 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Nat'l R.R. Adjustment Bd., First Div., 422 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th 
Cir. 1970) (noting that this will avoid unnecessarily burdening courts and possible 
embarrassment from conflicting results). The first-filed doctrine was established by the 
Supreme Court in Smith v. McIver, and has been flexibly applied to promote judicial 
economy and the interests of justice through avoidance of repeated or vexatious litigation. 
Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. 532 (1824) (noting concurrent suits in law and equity courts 
should be resolved by the court with possession of the first action). 
41 See Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737-38 (1st Cir. 1977) (“At the 
root of the preference for a manufacturer's declaratory judgment action is the recognition 
that, in reality, the manufacturer is the true defendant in the customer suit. In spite of 
[Plaintiff’s] vigorous protests to the contrary, it is a simple fact of life that a 
manufacturer must protect its customers, either as a matter of contract, or good business, 
or in order to avoid the damaging impact of an adverse ruling against its products.”).  
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courts have struggled to justify the first-filed rule itself on policy grounds42 
and, accordingly, have recognized exceptions.43 
One, applicable only in patent litigation, is the so-called “customer suit 
exception.”  When the technology and parties involved in a patent suit 
satisfy certain criteria, the customer suit exception allows a later-filed 
declaratory judgment action brought by the manufacturer of an accused 
product to take “precedence over a [earlier-filed] suit by the patent owner 
against customers of the manufacturer.”44  In other words, courts applying 
this exception stay earlier-filed patent cases against customers pending the 
resolution of the manufacturer’s later-filed declaratory judgment action 
against the patentholder.45  
                                                 
42 See Codex, 553 F.2d at 737 (“While the first-filed rule may ordinarily be a prudent one, 
it is so only because it is sometimes more important that there be a rule than that the rule 
be particularly sound.”). 
43  Other exceptions to the first-filed rule arise when: the first-filed action is an 
anticipatory declaratory judgment suit, see, e.g., Lawrence D. Graham, The Personal 
Jurisdiction Effect of Notifications of Infringement, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 858, 868-69 (1996), or the first-filed action was initiated for forum shopping 
purposes or otherwise in bad faith, see Maximum Human Performance, Inc. v. Dymatize 
Enters., Inc., No. 09-CV-235, 2009 WL 2778104 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2009).  
44 Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  Courts also make 
an exception to this general rule when the forum of a later-filed action is more convenient 
or just.  See Horton Archery, LLC v. Am. Hunting Innovations, LLC, No. 09-CV-1604,  
2010 WL 395572, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2010) (“The Federal Circuit has recognized 
two exceptions to the first-to-file rule, the customer-suit exception and a discretionary 
determination based on the convenience and suitability of competing forums.”). 
45 Spread Spectrum Screening LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 657 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011).  Often, the manufacturer’s declaratory judgment action and the patentholder’s 
infringement action are filed in separate forums, and courts have long recognized that the 
“customer-suit” cases frequently involve “forum shopping” by both the patent holder and 
the manufacturer: 
There appears to be a general attitude among the patent bar that the Second 
Circuit is most uncharitable to patents.  Consequently, a party desiring to have a 
patent declared invalid will probably seek to sue here, while a party suing to 
enforce its patent in an infringement suit will probably bring it elsewhere, even 
to the point of suing a customer of the infringer instead of the direct 
infringer. . . . I believe that a litigant, whether a swift first or as a prompt 
retaliator, is open to the charge of forum shopping wherever he chooses a forum 
with slight connection to the factual circumstances surrounding his suit.    
Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) 
(transferring the earlier filed case in Southern District of New York to later filed case in 
New Jersey on ground that “the business activities of all the parties of all the parties are 
more closely associated with New Jersey”). 
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In its first few decades of existence,46 courts applied the customer suit 
exception relatively liberally, justifying its application on efficiency 
grounds by reference to res judicata and claim preclusion.47  Resolution of 
a case between the patentee and manufacturer of the accused device is 
more likely to resolve the question of infringement definitively because, 
after a final resolution of that case, res judicata will generally bar future 
suits between the patentee and the manufacturer or its customers.48  By 
contrast, a final judgment in a patent suit against one customer does not 
bar suits against other customers or the manufacturer.49     
Courts also stressed during this time that the manufacturer of the 
accused technology, not customers who merely purchased or used it, is 
“the true defendant in a customer suit” since it “must protect its customers, 
either as a matter of contract, or good business, in order to avoid the 
damaging impact of an adverse ruling against its products.”50  Accordingly, 
courts reasoned, it makes sense as a matter of policy to give 
                                                 
46 The modern customer suit exception—i.e., staying a first-filed customer suit in favor of 
a later-filed manufacturer suit—first appeared in the 1960s.  See Delamere Co. v. Taylor-
Bell Co., 199 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (staying an earlier-filed customer action 
in favor of a suit filed by the manufacturer twenty days later); William Gluckin & Co. v. 
Int'l Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming a preliminary injunction 
staying a first-filed customer suit in favor of a manufacturer suit against the patentee). 
The doctrine has roots in even earlier cases expressing a preference for manufacturer 
suits. See, e.g., Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1929) 
(explaining that when patent suits are brought against both the manufacturer of the 
allegedly infringing goods and the manufacturer’s customers, the customer suits should 
generally be stayed pending an outcome in the manufacturer’s suit).  
47  Delamere, 199 F. Supp. at 57 (noting that a decision involving the manufacturer 
“would settle the issue finally and prevent further suits”).  In addition to res judicata and 
claim preclusion, the patent law doctrine of “exhaustion” generally prevents a patentee 
from licensing its rights at more than one level of the supply chain.  See Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (holding that the 
authorized sale of an article substantially embodying a patent exhausts the patent holder’s 
rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking the patent law to control post sale use 
of the article). 
48 Id.   
49  Id. (noting that a ruling in the “customer suit would not be res judicata against 
allegedly infringing manufacturer, and a decree against the patent would still leave the 
patent owner free to sue other customers”).  
50 Codex Corp. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737-738 (1st Cir. 1977); see 
also Delamere Co. v. Taylor-Bell Co., 199 F. Supp. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (noting 
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manufacturers, whose incentives in litigation might diverge from those of 
its customers, the reins of defense against claims of infringement. 
However, over time (and particularly in the last twenty years) 
jurisprudence related to the exception has become increasingly restrictive.  
For one, under current law, application of the customer suit exception 
turns solely on an analysis of judicial economy.  As interpreted by the 
Federal Circuit, “the guiding principles in the customer suit exception 
cases are efficiency and judicial economy,” not the consideration of other 
factors concerning the customers’ and manufacturers’ relative suitability as 
defendants.51   
Further, current case law recognizes an exceptionally narrow set of 
circumstances under which applying the customer suit exception would 
conserve judicial resources.  Federal Circuit precedent sets forth three 
factors to determine the exception’s applicability: (1) whether customer 
defendants are “mere resellers” of the manufacturer’s product; (2) 
whether the customers agree to be bound by any decision in the 
manufacturer’s case; and (3) whether the manufacturer is the sole source 
of the infringing products.52  By design, these factors collectively limit the 
customer suit exception to cases in which resolution of one manufacturer 
declaratory judgment action would completely resolve all pre-existing 
customer suits.53 
Together these factors also all but render the customer suit exception a 
dead letter.  The first factor excludes cases in which customer defendants 
incorporate the manufacturer’s product into a larger device—for example, 
as in Apeldyn v. Sony, when customer defendants install the 
manufacturer’s allegedly infringing LCD panels into their own brand 
name consumer electronics.54  The third excludes cases in which customer 
defendants purchased from more than a single manufacturer—for example, 
in Emerson Electric v. Black & Decker, where the customer defendant 
                                                 
51 Tegic Commc’n Corp. v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
52 Id. 
53 Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he primary 
question is whether the issues and parties are such that the disposition of one case would 
be dispositive of the other . . .”). 
54 Apeldyn Corp. v. Sony Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 568, 576 (D. Del. 2012) (declining to 
apply the customer suit exception because Sony is “more than a mere reseller of goods”). 
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purchased allegedly infringing workbenches for resale from two different 
suppliers.55  
In today’s high tech economy where complex devices like computers 
and consumer electronics top the market, it is hard to imagine many cases 
that would satisfy both requirements.  Due to increasing complexity and 
ever-shorter product lifecycles, few brand-name companies possess the 
manpower and expertise to manufacturer their own products.56 As a result, 
high-tech products—the dominant source of both issued patents and patent 
suits57—are overwhelmingly constructed (at least in part) using discrete 
components sourced from multiple manufacturers.58 
                                                 
55 Emerson Elec. Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 606 F.2d 234, 236 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(declining to apply the customer suit exception to stay a customer suit against Sears, in 
favor of a manufacturer suit against Emerson, because Sears previously purchases 
allegedly infringing workbenches from another supplier).   
56 Gijsbert van Lient, Subcontracting in Electronics: From Contract Manufacturers to 
Providers of Electronic Manufacturing Services (EMS), at *6 (Int’l Labor Office Working 
Paper No. 249, 2007), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_dialogue/---sector/documents/publication/wcms_161177.pdf (noting that brand-name 
companies can no longer manufacture their products on their own because of “the 
intensely competitive nature of the electronics industry, the ever increasing complexity 
and sophistication of electronic products . . .and the shorter product lifecycles”). 
57 High-tech patents have dominated the patent landscape for more than two decades.  See 
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent 
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 93 (2002) (finding that patents falling within the categories 
“computer-related,” “semiconductors,” “electronics,” “software,” and 
“communications-related” collectively account for about 53% of all patents issued during 
the 1990s).  By one estimate, one in six active U.S. patents relates to smartphone 
technology.  Daniel O’Connor, One in Six Active U.S. Patents Pertain to the Smartphone, 
DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT, Oct. 17, 2012, at http://www.project-
disco.org/intellectual-property/one-in-six-active-u-s-patents-pertain-to-the-smartphone/.  
Not surprisingly, high-tech patents are also the dominant source of patent suits.  See 
Love, supra note 11, at *37 (finding that about 65% of patents litigated by NPEs are 
high-tech patents, as are about 42% of patents litigated by product-producing companies); 
James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, at *12, Tbl. 2 (Boston 
University School of Law Working Paper No. 11-45, Sep. 19, 2011)  (finding that 62% 
of patents litigated by NPEs between 1990 and 2010 were “software patents” and 75% 
covered “computer and communications technology.”). 
58  Today, the component parts of brand-name products are generally sourced from 
multiple manufacturers.  For example, Apple’s iPad 2 includes components sources from 
at least ten vendors.  Simon Foxman, 10 Public Companies That Have Parts In The New 
iPad, BUSINESS INSIDER, March 16, 2012, available at 
http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-companies-that-made-parts-for-the-new-
ipad-2012-3?op=1.  Similarly, Samsung’s Galaxy Tab includes components sourced 
from at least nine vendors.  Allan Yogasingam, Inside the Samsung Galaxy Tab: Taking 
On The iPad, EE TIMES, Dec. 13, 2010, available at 
  
 
15  Draft 15-Mar-13 
 
II. MANUFACTURERS ARE THE “TRUE PARTY IN INTEREST” 
 
The Federal Circuit’s current, rigid stance on the doctrine both 
overstates the costs and understates the benefits of applying the customer 
suit exception more frequently.  First, on the cost side of the ledger, 
existing case law takes an unnecessarily myopic view of judicial economy 
by considering only the doctrine’s impact on already-filed suits.  Broadly 
viewed, however, revival of the customer suit exception promises to 
substantially reduce court dockets by discouraging future patent suits filed 
for nuisance value.  Second, on the benefit side, current case law fails to 
take into account other socially-desirable results of nudging patent defense 
up the supply chain.  In particular, compared to their downstream 
customers, manufacturers are better suited to both invalidate erroneously 
issued patents and properly value valid ones.  
     
A. Manufacturers Have Incentive to Fight Nuisance Suits 
 
The Federal Circuit’s present test for weighing the customer suit 
exception’s impact on judicial economy fails to strike a socially optimal 
balance because it fails to consider customers’ and manufacturers’ relative 
incentives to litigate infringement claims.  Compared to individual 
customers, manufacturers have more reason to litigate patent suits, even 
nuisance suits, to a final adjudication.  Accordingly, liberal application of 
the customer suit exception would discourage weak patent suits and, thus, 
promises to conserve judicial economy. 
Customer defendants rationally view patent litigation through the prism 
of their own costs and benefits, without regard to the best interests of their 
competitors.  Absent coordination, 59  customers faced with infringement 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.eetimes.com/design/communications-design/4211447/Inside-the-Samsung-
Galaxy-Tab--Taking-on-the-iPad-semiconductor?pageNumber=0. Manufacturers likewise 
generally work for multiple brand-name companies.  See van Lient, supra note 56, at 10 
(noting, for example, that “Hon Hai Foxconn counts among its clients: Apple, H-P, Intel, 
Dell, Lenovo, Nokia and Motorola”).  Third-party manufacturers are presently active in 
the production of communications devices (e.g., mobile phones and networking 
equipment), personal and business computers (e.g., data storage devices), and consumer 
electronics (e.g., gaming systems).  Id. at 11. 
59  Co-defendants are permitted to share information and litigation expenses, but are 
prohibited from coordinating with respect to settlement negotiations.  See Mark A. 
Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. 
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allegations are incentivized to settle for as little as possible and point the 
patentee in the direction of its competition, whom it has a strong incentive 
to see sued and forced to pay as much or more in costs and royalties.60  
Manufacturer defendants, on the other hand, view patent suits with a 
larger constituency in mind: its entire population of customers, including 
all current and future customers.  Thus, manufacturers that sell to a wide-
range of customers and that plan to continue developing products in the 
field of the asserted patent, have a vested interest in resolving patent 
disputes in a forward-looking manner to (1) protect all its customers and 
(2) maximize its future freedom of operation and its profitability.  As such, 
a manufacturer is less likely than any individual customer to let the 
expected legal cost associated with a single patent case drive its decision to 
fight or license the asserted patent. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
REV. 1889, 1940 (2002); Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 361 F.2d 451, 459 (3d Cir. 
1966). Efficiency gains from information and expense sharing are often offset by other 
inefficiencies associated with large suits, including the difficulties inherent in 
coordinating multiple parties and lawyers. See, e.g., Michael M. Markman, Getting 
Ahead in the Changing Patent Litigation Marketplace: Thinking About a New Toolkit for 
Pre‐Suit Coordination of Patent Joint Defense Efforts, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, vol. 5, 
no. 28 (2011), available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/2ad48d32-3210-4cd9-
9b73-d6cdb2c72948/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2d69f7d0-0cab-49a4-ad9e-
e3f7759828e8/bloomberg%20law_markman_article7.7.11.pdf (“It can be difficult to 
create a frictionless approach to collaboration that also limits transaction costs. ‘Herding 
the cats’ can be time consuming and inefficient . . . .”).  In addition to our own anecdotal 
experiences, the market clearly supports this hypothesis: NPEs overwhelmingly choose to 
sue infringers in large, multi-defendant cases, despite the fact that this strategy enables 
coordination among defendants.  See Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying 
Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 688-89 (2012) (“Unlike product-
producing companies, patent trolls commonly employ a litigation strategy of initiating 
infringement suits against large numbers of unrelated, geographically diverse defendants 
in venues friendly to patent plaintiffs . . . .”); Allison et al., supra note 12, at 700 
(“[D]efendants in multiparty patent cases should be more likely to settle out and leave 
their competitors holding the bag, particularly because while defendants can share 
information, they cannot act jointly in deciding to settle.”). 
60 See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, in 8 INNOVATION 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 111, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2007); Mark A. Lemley 
& Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 88; Joseph 
Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation 
Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might 
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) (“[A] challenger bears the cost of 
litigation but its rivals and downstream buyers will capture almost all the benefits of 
successful challenge . . . .”). 
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i. Customers’ Incentives to Litigate 
 
NPEs prefer customer defendants over manufacturers because 
customer defendants are generally one-time players61 with little incentive 
to help non-parties or stand up to litigation tactics.62  Independent of the 
merits of a case, most customer defendants will take whatever option 
results in less cost—including a license priced less than the expected cost 
of litigation.63  
From the standpoint of a one-time-player customer defendant, a single 
patent lawsuit bears an expected (negative) value of: 
 
                                                 
61 Innovatio, for example, targeted many companies that had never before been accused 
of patent infringement—for example, eleven separate Chicago-area Marriot hotel 
franchises.  Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC v. JW Marriot Chicago, No. 1:11-cv-06478 
(N.D. Ill.).  Lodsys has done the same, accusing numerous first-time alleged infringers 
like travel websites Makemytrip.com, Inc. and Vegas.com LLC, used car seller 
Drivetime Automotive Group, Inc., and brand manager ForeSee Results, Inc.  Lodsys 
Group, LLC v. MakeMyTrip.com, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00749 (E.D. Tex.); Lodsys, LLC 
v. Adidas America, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00283 (E.D. Tex.); Lodsys, LLC v. DriveTime 
Automotive Grp., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00309 (E.D. Tex).  To be sure, this characterization 
doesn’t apply to all companies who are, strictly speaking, customers of some other 
supplier.  For example, in the ongoing “smartphone patent wars” between Apple and 
Android phone makers, defendants Samsung, HTC, and Motorola Mobility are accused 
of infringing patents that allegedly cover various features of the Android operating 
system, which is supplied by Google.  See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Apple, Samsung, 
Google and the Smartphone Patent Wars - Everything You Need to Know, GUARDIAN, 
Oct. 22, 2012, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/oct/22/smartphone-patent-wars-explained.  
All three phone makers are sued for patent infringement more than a dozen times a year.  
PatentFreedom, Most Pursued Companies, at https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-
npes/pursued/ (last accessed Feb. 19, 2013). 
62 Kamprath, supra note 27, at 27; Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 125 (1974).   
63  Reiko Aoki & Jin-Li Hu, Allocation of Legal Costs and Patent Litigation: A 
Cooperative Game Approach, at *10 (Univ. of Auckland Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper 
Series, 1999), available at http://128.118.178.162/eps/io/papers/9612/9612001.pdf 
(noting that defendants are willing to pay plaintiffs more to settle suits as expected 
litigation costs increase); Kamprath, supra note 27, at 25 ("With each early settlement, 
the patent troll maximizes his profit and minimizes his own litigation costs.").  Indeed, as 
courts have recognized, license fees “negotiated in the face of a threat of high litigation 
costs may be strongly influenced by a desire to avoid full litigation.” Panduit Corp. v. 
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1164 n.11 (6th Cir. 19780) (quoting 
Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 164 (1889)); see also Richard L. Stroup, Patentee's 
Monetary Recovery from an Infringer, 59 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 362, 384 (1977).  
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E = (p*(D+C)) – (1-p)(C)) 
 
where “E” is the expected value (loss) associated with the case, “p” is the 
probability of the plaintiff successfully enforcing its patent, “D” is the 
expected damages amount, and “C” is the cost of defense. 
Additionally, for any defendant, it is rational to settle a case for an 
amount “S” that is less than the expected value of defense: 
 
S < E 
 
Combining both equations, it is straightforward to show that a 
customer defendant will rationally settle for less than the cost of defense, 
even when faced with an extremely “weak” patent with virtually no 
chance of ultimate success (e.g., the patent is almost certainly invalid 
and/or not infringed).64  In short, even if p ≈ 0 and therefore E ≈ C, 
 
  E = p*(D+C) – (1-p)(C)  
 
lim E = 0*(D+C) – (1-0)(C)  
p  0 
                                                 
64 This analysis also assumes that a patentee enforcing a weak patent will not be forced to 
pay a successful defendant’s attorneys fees or some other amount as a sanction for filing 
a frivolous case.  Though certainly not unheard of, sanctions against patentees are 
exceedingly rare.  See supra note 24.  It also assumes that customer defendants view 
patent infringement allegations as a rare occurrence and, thus, do not benefit from 
fighting back simply to build a reputation as a “tough mark.”  This assumption holds true 
for the customers defendants we have in mind—i.e., the coffee shops sued by Innovatio 
and small offices sued by Project Paperless—though of course it will not hold true for 
“customer” defendants.  See supra note 61.  Parties that face NPE claims on a regular 
basis may benefit from routinely defending suits (rather than settling them) because pre-
committing to litigate may deter other patentees looking to file suit against targets 
amenable to quick settlements.  Companies like Twitter and Newegg have publicly vowed 
to fight NPE suits, regardless of the expense involved.  See, e.g., Ben Lee, Twitter: It’s 
time for patent trolls to bear the costs of frivolous lawsuits, GIGAOM, Oct. 8, 2012, at 
http://gigaom.com/2012/10/08/twitter-time-for-trolls-to-pay-full-price-for-patent-
mischief/ (“[W]e [Twitter] have never agreed to pay to settle a patent suit.”); Joe Mullin, 
How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” Patent and Saved Online Retail, supra note 
21 (“Newegg is unique in its willingness to take on patent troll cases and fight them 
through trial.”).  As indirect evidence of both propositions, consider Allison, et al.’s 
finding that, between 2000 and 2010, NPEs asserted 106 patents in 8 or more cases 
each—settling almost 90% of these cases and, when forced to litigate to a judgment, 
losing more than 90% of the time.  Allison et al., supra note 12, at 689. 
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= C 
 
a defendant will rationally settle for any amount less than the expected 
cost of defense.65  
 
S < E = C 
 
A customer defendant, thus, will generally agree to pay royalties even 
when the patent-in-suit has virtually no substantive value.66  Looking to 
statistics on the cost of defense in patent suits, customer defendants will 
find it rational to pay a pretty penny, too.  According to the AIPLA, the 
median cost of a medium-sized patent litigation is approximately six 
million dollars per party, double the cost reported 2009 and four times the 
cost reported in 2001.67  
Thus, because customers will generally find it rational to settle with 
NPEs holding even incredibly weak patents—and often to settle for six 
figure amounts—NPEs will find it profitable to sue as many judgment-
proof customers as possible.  Statistics bear this out.  NPEs in the business 
of purchasing patents for assertion sue almost nineteen defendants per 
patent they litigate. 68   Nuisance-value NPEs sue even more broadly.  
Innovatio, for example, has sued over 200 defendants in 26 suits, once 
accusing 80 companies in a single complaint.69  The end result is a flood 
of litigation that taxes the federal court system. 
 
                                                 
65 See Sudarshan, supra note 25, at 161-166 (2008). 
66  See Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against 
Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 159, 160 (2006); 
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 
1347 (2008) (using a game theoretic model to show how weak patents can be used to 
extract royalties that exceed their social value); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why 
“Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We Change? The Private and 
Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 77-95 (2006). 
67 See supra note 3.  When the amount at stake in a patent suit is less than $1 million, 
litigation costs will generally exceed the patentee’s possible recover.  AMERICAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 
at I-155-56.  Also, more than half of all patent litigation costs are incurred during 
discovery, before a decision on the merits can be rendered.  Id. 
68 Love, supra note 11, at 29, 33 (finding that, overall, NPEs accuse an average of 
twelve infringers per litigated patent, and that NPEs who purchase patents for litigation 
accuse almost 19 infringers per patent on average). 
69 Results tabulated using LexMachina.com’s search functionality on February 19, 2013. 
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ii. Manufacturers’ Incentives 
 
Manufacturers are in a different economic position.  Compared to their 
customers, manufacturers are more likely to take a forward-looking view 
of patent litigation.  In particular, when deciding whether to litigate or 
settle, manufacturers rationally consider their current and future product 
offerings, customer populations, and litigation budgets.  In short, litigation 
is never a one-time affair because the same patentee, or another, may 
accuse new products in the future.   
As a result, litigation offers unique benefits to a manufacturing 
defendant.  By defending a suit, the manufacture may be able to nail down 
the outer boundaries of the asserted patent through the claim construction 
process.  Doing so may provide the manufacturer with a strong argument 
for non-infringement in the present case or, alternatively, a clear path to 
“design around” the patent in future products.70   
In addition, a manufacturer may choose to defend a case simply to 
send a message to future NPEs.  Manufacturers who anticipate similar 
suits in the future may be concerned that a quick settlement in the present 
case will encourage other NPEs watching the lawsuit to sue the 
manufacturer or its customer.71  
Together, these factors reduce a patentee’s ability to drive a 
manufacturer to settle through litigation costs alone.  In other words, 
manufacturers will generally perceive a certain positive value associated 
with litigating.  This transforms the above formula in the following 
manner: 
 
E = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C*(1-(1/L)) 
 
                                                 
70 Rantanen, supra note 66, at 161. 
71  Id. (there are costs to the infringer of not litigating – other patent trolls may take the 
willingness to take a license to the patent “as an invitation to feast.”). Twitter has 
publicly refused to settle with patent trolls. Lee, supra note 64 (reporting that Twitter 
receives many baseless patent threats and “our policy is to fight them with all our 
might . . . . we have never agreed to pay to settle a patent suit”). Newegg also refuses to 
settle with patent rolls, recently winning on an appeal that rendered Soverain shopping 
cart patents invalid. Jon Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shopping Cart” Patent and 
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where L is the manufacturer’s perceived litigation “discount percentage” – 
i.e., the ratio between legal dollars spent in this case and expected future 
savings that would flow from a victory against the patentee on the merits 
(e.g., 1:2 or 0.5).72 
Because of manufacturers’ forward-looking view of litigation, they 
will often have sufficient incentive to litigate even exceptionally weak 
cases.  Even when p ≈ 0, E is a factor of C and L:   
 
E = p*(D+C) – (1-p)(C)*(1-(1/L))  
 
 lim E = 0*(D+C) – (1-0)(C)*(1-(1/L))   
      p  0 
= C*(1-(1/L)) 
 
Thus, when 0 < L < 1, the manufacturer will have an incentive to bear 
the cost of defense and litigate the case on the merits.  Even when L > 1, 
the manufacturer will be less susceptible than a customer to litigation cost 
hold-up.  Any forward-looking benefit the manufacturer sees to litigation—
even a rather small one—will reduce the amount for which the 
manufacturer is willing to settle. 
In short, compared to its customers, a manufacturer has considerably 
more incentive to mount a defense against allegations of patent 
infringement, especially when the patent-in-suit is exceptionally weak.  By 
permitting patent suits against customers to proceed unimpeded, rather 
than permitting manufacturers to step in and litigate on behalf of their 
disinterested customers, current case law actually encourages nuisance 
suits.  Without a strong customer suit exception, strategic strike suit filers 
have little to fear if they unexpectedly file a large number of suits against 
customer defendants.  Without forewarning, manufacturers cannot beat 
patentees to the courthouse.73  As a result, manufacturers are left waiting 
                                                 
72 To be clear, this is a grossly oversimplified equation.  An infringer may still be able to 
cultivate a reputation as a tough litigator, even if it loses from time to time.  Likewise, an 
accused infringer could lose on the merits of a case but nonetheless cabin the patentee 
into a particularly narrow claim construction that is easy to avoid in the future.   
73 And some forewarning still isn’t enough to support declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 
There must be “sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment.”  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (holding a 
licensee is not required to terminate or breach a license agreement before seeking a 
declaratory judgment of patent invalidity). 
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in line to litigate, powerlessly watching their customers settle what appear 
to be spurious claims. 
If courts routinely stayed customer suits to permit willing 
manufacturers to litigate first, nuisance suits would instead be discouraged.  
At a minimum, strike suit filers would have to strategically target the 
customers of manufacturers who lacked the resources or foresight to 
litigate on behalf of their customers.  And, in the long term, even this 
strategy might prove infeasible as customers increasingly purchased from 
manufacturers who proved willing to litigate.  In short, as more 
manufacturers become willing to litigate, there are fewer targets for 
nuisance suits and those targets that remain are less appealing.  
Thus, though a more liberal application of the customer suit exception 
may increase the number of suits on federal court dockets in the short 
term, there is good reason to believe it would lead to fewer nuisance suits 
in the long term. 
 
B. Manufacturers Are Better Positioned To Defend Infringement 
Claims on the Merits 
 
In addition to a myopic view of the customer suit exception’s impact 
on judicial economy, Federal Circuit precedent also fails to properly 
weigh—indeed, to give weight to at all—other benefits of permitting 
manufacturers to defend patent suits.  One benefit is a manufacturer’s 
greater technical capacity and, thus, enhanced ability to vigorously litigate 
the merits of a patent case.   
As the entity actually developing products in the field of the asserted 
patent, the manufacturer is the company best positioned to litigate the 
merits of a case enforcing that patent.  Using in-house knowledge of the 
accused technology, a manufacturer can generate non-infringement 
arguments and identify “design around” options.  Likewise, relying on 
employees who have worked in the field of the invention for a substantial 
period of time, a manufacture is best able to identify potential prior art.    
Consider a customer defendant and a manufacturer defendant who 
have similar incentives to litigate a non-frivolous case (i.e., p > 0) 
without regard to the case’s impact on future suit (i.e., when the 
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EC = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C 
 
EM = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C*(1-(1/L)) 
 
lim EM = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C*(1-(1/ ∞)) 
L  ∞ 
= p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C*(1-0) 
 




In this scenario, S is a factor of p, D, and C for customers and 
manufacturers. 
 
S < EM = EC = p*(D+C) – (1-p)*C 
 
Assuming that the cost of defense is relatively similar for both parties,74 
the financial transfer that will result from the case is driven by the 
patentee’s likelihood of success and potential damages award. 
Social welfare is maximized—or, rather, deadweight loss resulting 
from the patent system is minimized—when litigation accurately values 
patented inventions.75  Thus, it is in society’s best interest for infringement 
                                                 
74 Litigation costs in civil suits are highly correlated with the amount at stake in a suit, 
not with the type of defendant facing those stakes.  See Emery G. Lee & Thomas E. 
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 
772 (2010) (“Our findings indicate that the monetary stakes in the litigation represent the 
primary cost driver in most civil litigation”).  Patent suits are no exception.  See 
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 2011, at I-155-56 (reporting mean litigation costs as a factor of the amount at 
stake in the case). 
75 See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, in 8 Innovation 
Policy and the Economy 111, 111 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.pdf (“[E]xcessive patentee rewards are socially 
costly as they raise the deadweight loss associated with the patent system and discourage 
innovation by others.”); Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual 
Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 214 (1999) 
(“If the system overcompensates the inventor, the protection may actually impede 
innovation by denying competitors (and users) access to needed information and basic 
inventions that could serve as building blocks for further progress. In short, because 
competition also plays a role in fostering innovation, overprotection of a patent holder 
from competition may perversely result in less, rather than more, innovation.”). 
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defense to be handled by the party best suited to test the patent-in-suit’s 
validity, scope, and value.76   
As between a similarly situated customer and manufacturer, it is 
virtually always the manufacturer who is best suited to vigorously litigate 
the case in a manner that challenges the patent’s validity and delineates its 
claim scope.  The classic target for a patent troll is a company outside the 
technology industry who merely purchases the accused technology.  
Unlike the manufacturer, these companies have no expertise in the accused 
technology.  They were not involved in the design, development or 
manufacture of the accused technology.  They have no understanding of 
the field of the patent and no knowledge of the prior art to the patent.  
When the patent relates to a component within a larger system, customers 
may not even be aware of the accused technology or understand what role 
it plays in the overall system. 
By contrast, manufacturers are well situated to litigate the merits of a 
patent suit because they possess in-house knowledge and expertise relevant 
to the patent-in-suit’s validity. It was the manufacturer’s employees, after 
all, who designed, developed, and initially sold the product or component 
embodying the accused technology.  These individuals meet or exceed the 
qualifications of a “person having of ordinary skill in the art” and, thus, 
can provide ready insight into a patent’s vulnerabilities.77 
                                                 
76 Society’s interest is surprisingly strong.  A large percentage of patented inventions are 
later deemed unworthy of protection, and a large percentage of patent allegations are 
later proven to be unwarranted.  Patent claims adjudicated on the merits are invalidated 
about 55 percent of the time.  Benjamin Hershkowitz, What Are My Chances? From Idea 
Through Litigation, FIND LAW, Oct. 16, 2003, available at 
http://immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/GENREF/F031016H.pdf. 
Moreover, patentees prove infringement only about 40 percent of the time their 
allegations are tested in court.  Id.  Overall, only about 30 percent of patent claims 
litigated to a decision on the merits are found both valid and infringed.  Id.  
77 In many contexts, patent law asks courts and juries to view the patented invention and 
other technology from the perspective of a “person having ordinary skill in the art.”  See 
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (obviousness: “[T]he 
test of obviousness . . . [is] whether the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior 
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains . . . .”); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(claim construction: “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the 
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at 
the time of the invention . . . .”); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (enablement: requiring that a patent’s 
specification “contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear, 
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Specifically, a manufacturer’s in-house knowledgebase is a valuable 
source of prior art and expert analysis.  Manufacturers are generally 
familiar with the history of their own product offerings as well as the 
history of the industry writ large.  As a result, manufacturers frequently 
can locate prior art that even the most sophisticated third-party prior art 
searchers cannot.  For example, manufacturers generally have historical 
records of products sold or offered for sale prior to the patent-in-suit’s 
priority date, as well as access to engineers’ notebooks or other materials 
that may establish a conception date for the accused technology that 
antedates the patent’s.  In addition, manufacturers have greater exposure 
to other sources of non-traditional prior art like demonstrations at trade 
shows and presentations at academic or industry conferences.78 
Manufacturers’ in-house expertise is also helpful in establishing non-
infringement.  Employees of the manufacturer are intimately familiar with 
the accused technology and have ready access to detailed design 
specifications.79  Customer defendants, on the other hand, generally gain 
access to this information, if at all, indirectly through expensive third-
party expert witnesses.   
Without employees of their own who are knowledgeable about the 
accused technology, customer defendants must look elsewhere for 
technical information that manufacturers have at their fingertips.  The 
highly confidential nature of technical information regarding the accused 
product further complicates this process.  Manufacturers are reluctant to 
entrust confidential design information with any third-party, even their 
                                                                                                                            
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use 
the same . . . .”). 
78 See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (invalidating a patent in 
light of prior art briefly displayed at a conference). 
79 Cf. Tore Markeset & Uday Kumar, Design and Development of Product Support and 
Maintenance Concepts for Industrial Systems, JOURNAL OF QUALITY IN MAINTENANCE 
ENGINEERING, Vol. 9 Iss. 4, at 376 (2003) (“The specification process is often a result of 
interaction between the manufacturer and the industrial customer, while the design 
specification implementation process is the responsibility of the manufacturer.”). 
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customers, for fear of jeopardizing their trade secret rights 80  and of 
attracting additional patent suits81 should that information become public.   
Confidentiality concerns also narrow the pool of experts available to 
work with customer defendants.  Manufacturers, for example, will almost 
certainly refuse to share confidential information with technical personnel 
presently working in the industry—i.e., for a competitor—thereby 
excluding most industry specialists from serving as expert witnesses.  
Likewise, if it is not clear that the manufacturer will agree to indemnify, 
customers may be reluctant to turn over the reins of preparing expert 
reports and testimony to the manufacturer for fear that the manufacturer’s 
employees will be loyal first and foremost to their employer, not its 
customer.  Even when indemnity is assured, customers who foresee using 
other manufacturers’ designs in the future may want to keep expert 
witnesses on a short lease to ensure that their positions do not exonerate 
their present supplier at the expense of their future supplier.  The end 
result is that customer defendants generally hire academics or 
“professional expert” witnesses who are no longer actively working in the 
field of the invention and who may be attacked in court as “hired guns.”82  
                                                 
80  Trade secret law only protects information that is “not . . . generally known.”  
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i) (1985).  Information loses its protected status once it 
is publicized, even if that disclosure was made by a third-party.  See, e.g., Religious 
Tech. Center v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that stolen 
information posted online was no longer protectable as a trade secret). 
81
 For example, manufacturers who are frequent targets of patent suits are reluctant to 
release technical information that might be used by the plaintiff, or other patentees, to 
identify additional patents that could be enforced down the road against the manufacturer 
or its customers.  Manufacturers are also worry about “submarine patenting.”  See, e.g., 
Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 425-26 
(2012) (“Using (or perhaps abusing) the continuation process, it is surprisingly simple for 
a patentee to win claims covering products and technology introduced into the market 
well after her original application was filed. This practice [is] sometimes called 
‘submarine patenting’ . . . .”).  In other words, they worry that the plaintiff or another 
patentee might have pending patent applications that can be modified on the basis of 
disclosed technical information so that they precisely cover the manufacturer’s products.  
Customer defendants that don’t produce products are not familiar with these concerns and, 
thus, are less likely than manufacturers to safeguard against these threats—for example, 
by including a “patent prosecution bar” in protective orders.  See James Juo & David J. 
Pitman, A Prosecution Bar in Patent Litigation Should Be the Exception Rather than the 
Rule, 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 42, 43 (2010) (“[A] prosecution bar . . . prohibit[s] attorneys 
who receive the disclosing party‘s confidential information from prosecuting patents on 
behalf of the receiving party.”). 
82 See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current 
Controls and Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 253 (2001) (arguing that  
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C. Manufacturers Are Better Positioned To Value Patent Rights 
 
Another benefit the Federal Circuit’s test ignores is the manufacturer’s 
ability to negotiate a settlement consistent with the value of the patented 
technology and financial realities of the field of the invention.  For many 
of the same reasons manufacturers are best suits to argue the merits of 
patent claims, manufacturers are also uniquely positioned to ensure that 
damages awarded for infringement align with the actual value of the 
patented technology.  Compared to individual customers, a manufacturer 
is more likely to possess information relevant to reasonable royalty 
calculations, more likely to correctly apportion value between patented 
and unpatented features, and less likely to collude with the patentee to the 
detriment of future accused infringers.  
First, manufacturers generally have in-house knowledge of the 
financial realities of the industry, including industry-standard licensing 
rates and practices, as well as the value of (or cost-savings attributable to) 
the accused technology, including how it compares with potential 
alternatives. 83   These considerations are directly relevant to calculating 
reasonable royalty damages, typically the only remedy an NPE can hope 
for.84   
                                                                                                                            
professional experts are perversely incentivized to testify positively for the party who 
hires them because experts cannot be held accountable in tort or contract law by the 
opposing party).  To be effective, these experts generally must obtain information from 
other third-parties who are actively working in industry.  Often, the only avenue to 
obtain this information is depositions, which are very structured, occasionally adversarial, 
generally limited in time and scope, and thus far from an ideal method of gathering 
information.   
83 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that reasonable royalty damages should take into consideration 
“[t]he utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, 
that had been used for working out similar results” and “[t]he portion of the profit or of 
the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable 
businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions”). 
84 NPEs cannot seek "lost profit" damages because they typically do not manufacture or 
sell products that compete with products accused of infringement.  See Panduit Corp. v. 
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).  Moreover, 
because the NPEs are in the business of collecting royalties, they frequently cannot 
satisfy the "irreparable harm" prong of 4-factor test for an injunction.  See, e.g., Lily 
Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies Reconstructed, 25 SANTA 
CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 787, 798 (2009) (noting that between May 2006 and 
October 2008 just three permanent injunctions were issued in NPE cases, while 39 were 
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Under the Georgia-Pacific standard, reasonable royalty damages must 
be set at a rate that takes into account, among other considerations: 
 
The rates paid by the [infringer] for the use of other patents 
comparable to the patent in suit . . . . The effect of selling 
the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products 
of the [infringer] . . . . The established profitability of the 
product made under the patent . . . . The utility and 
advantages of the patent property over the old modes or 
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar 
results . . . . [T]he benefits to those who have used the 
invention . . . . The portion of the profit or of the selling 
price that may be customary in the particular business or in 
comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention 
or analogous inventions . . . . The portion of the realizable 
profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements . . . or 
significant features or improvements added by the 
infringer.85 
 
For each category of evidence listed above, it is the infringing 
product’s manufacturer, rather than one purchaser, who is in the best 
position to marshal evidence of the patent’s value.  A customer involved 
                                                                                                                            
issued in cases between product-producing companies).  In any event, reasonable 
royalties is the predominant form of damages in patent cases.  See PWC PATENT 
LITIGATION STUDY 12 (reporting that from 2002-2009 reasonable royalties were awarded 
in 77.9% of patent cases where damages were awarded). 
85 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.  Patentees who cannot prove that they are 
entitled to lost profit damages—frequently because they do not sell a product, let alone 
one covered by their patent—may recover as damages only the reasonable royalty for 
which they could have licensed their patent to the infringer.  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 
(permitting court to award “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in 
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer”).  In setting this reasonable royalty rate, courts attempt to reconstruct the 
hypothetical bargain that the parties would have negotiated had they willingly tried to do 
so at the time infringement began.  See Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1157-58 (“A reasonable 
royalty is an amount which a person, desiring to manufacture and sell a patented article, 
as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make 
and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit.” (quoting Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937))).  
To recreate this “willing licensor-willing licensee” royalty, courts generally rely on the 
fifteen factors set forth in Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
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in a one-off patent suit is unlikely to have licensed a patent before, let 
alone one comparable to the patent-in-suit. 86  The manufacturer, on the 
other hand, may have licensed many, both as licensor and licensee.   
A customer likewise has far less evidence related to sales made along 
with the patented technology and the benefits associated with its use.  A 
customer is intimately familiar with its own decision to purchase and 
anticipated benefits, but a manufacturer generally will be familiar with the 
needs, preferences, and willingness to pay of its entire customer base and 
may well have already commissioned industry-wide surveys on these 
topics.87  
In addition, a manufacturer is generally in a better position to 
apportion value between patented and unpatented88 features of the product 
and to estimate the value of the patented features compared to the next 
best alternative.  First, a manufacturer is better able to determine the 
fraction of its revenue attributable to non-patented features of its product 
and the fraction attributable to the invention claimed in the asserted patent.  
Again, though a customer is intimately familiar with its own valuation of 
the product it purchased and its (potentially) myriad features, a 
manufacturer generally will be familiar with the aggregate preferences of 
its entire customer base and likely possesses previously-acquired data on 
these topics.  The manufacturer is also better equipped to discover, 
catalogue, and value non-infringing alternative technology.  Though the 
customer may have shopped around and become familiar with some 
alternatives to the product it purchased, the manufacturer possesses in-
house expertise in the field of the invention and is, thus, far better-
equipped to design-around the patent by designing a non-infringing 
                                                 
86 See supra note 61. 
87 See, e.g., Darrell Rigby, Management Tools Survey 2003: Usage Up as Companies 
Strive to Make Headway in Tough Times, STRATEGY & LEADERSHIP vol. 31, iss. 5, at 6 
(2003) (“Of the respondents, 78 percent said they use [customer relationship management] 
systems, compared with 35 percent in 2000. Customer surveys and customer 
segmentation strategies both landed in the top ten in terms of usage and satisfaction.”); 
PAUL HAGUE ET AL., MARKET RESEARCH IN PRACTICE 4 (2004) (explaining that effective 
market research generates data on: customers’ “likelihood of adoption of new products,” 
“customer satisfaction” with existing products, and customers’ “unmet needs”). 
88“Unpatented” in the sense that the features or components are not covered by the patent 
at issue in the case—not that they are completely unpatented. This convention is also 
followed in the case law. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (explicitly defining “unpatented” as “not covered by the patent in suit”).  
Components of a complex device may, of course, be covered by a multitude of patents.  
See infra note 91. 
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version.89  In fact, the manufacturer may well sell a non-infringing version 
of the accused product and, thereby, have ready access to data reflecting 
the value added by the patented version. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, manufacturers have a practical 
advantage over entities below them on the supply chain when it comes to 
damages apportionment: they sell the smallest infringing unit. 90   As 
products move down the supply chain they often become components of 
larger, complex devices, rather than products in their own right.  Devices 
purchased by end users often incorporate hundreds or thousands, and 
sometimes even hundreds of thousands of individually patented 
inventions.91   
Fortunately for patentees (and unfortunately for accused infringers), 
the larger and more complex the accused device is relative to the patented 
                                                 
89 For example, in litigation between Apple and companies selling phones using Google’s 
Android mobile operating system, it was Android creator Google (rather than customer 
defendants like Samsung and HTC) that developed noninfringing alternatives to some of 
Apple’s software patents.  See, e.g., Brad Reed, How Google Reworked Android to Step 
Around Apple’s Deadly ’915 Patent, BGR, Aug. 30, 2012, at 
http://bgr.com/2012/08/30/apple-patent-analysis-google-android/. 
90 Chao, supra note 26, at 115 (finding that damages awards should be smaller if the 
patentee chooses to sue the manufacturer because “[u]nder the current system of 
permissive apportionment, attorneys representing the manufacturer will point out that the 
patented invention is only [a] small part of a much larger product. Moreover, these 
arguments will be buttressed by instructions from the judge that incorporates the 
thirteenth Georgia-Pacific factor.”).   
91 According to a study by patent aggregator RPX, the average smartphone incorporates 
about 250,000 patented inventions. See RPX Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 
59 (Sept. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/dsl.htm (“Based 
on our research, we believe that there are more than 250,000 active patents relevant to 
today’s smartphones . . . . .”).  See also Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: 
Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 307, 341 (2006) (“‘[S]oftware and computers are examples of ‘system’ 
products—they comprise thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of individually 
functioning components and features all assembled in a package for a customer. Because 
many of these features could be the subjects of a patent, it is often the case that thousands 
of patents may be relevant to a particular computer or software product.’” (quoting 
Patent Quality Improvement, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 52 (2005) (statement of 
Richard J. Lutton, Jr., Chief Patent Counsel, Apple Computer, Inc., on behalf of the 
Business Software Alliance))); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and 
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992 (2007) (“[M]odern products such as 
microprocessors, cell phones, or memory devices can easily be covered by dozens or 
even hundreds of different patents.”). 
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technology, the larger damages awards tend to be.  In many situations, 
patentees are overcompensated—and socially-valuable, but potentially-
infringing, commercialization is over-deterred—as a result. 92  
Overcompensation occurs for at least two interrelated reasons.  For one, 
the larger the accused device, the harder it is for jurors to distinguish 
between value attributable to the patented invention and value attributable 
to other features and components.93  Second, the “anchoring” effect of the 
larger sales price of a larger device, allows patentees to ask for larger 
damages amounts without appearing unreasonable.94 The cumulative result 
is that reasonable royalty awards tend to hover around 10-15% of the 
revenue of the accused product, regardless of the complexity of that 
product relative to the patented invention.95  Naturally, given the choice, 
the owner of a patent related to 3G wireless technology would prefer to 
pursue 10-15% of a $600 smartphone, rather than 10-15% of the $6.50 
3G wireless chipset installed therein.96  
Manufacturer suits dampen both value-skewing effects.  Manufacturers 
often sell a smaller device than the one end-users ultimately purchase.  
With fewer components to distinguish, apportionment is easier.  Likewise, 
with fewer components, revenue totals are smaller and consequently 
anchoring has less impact.    
Finally (and perhaps surprisingly), once a customer decides to settle, it 
has a strong incentive to actually help the patentholder game the system 
for awarding patent damages.  The reason is simple: defending a patent 
suit generates uncompensated positive externalities. 97   A customer 
                                                 
92 See Chao, supra note 26, at 99.  
93 Id. at 111-113. 
94 Id. at 115-118.  
95 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 91, at 2034-35 (analyzing all reasonable royalty 
damages awards reported in Westlaw between 1982 and February 2005 that could be 
calculated as a percentage of the sale price of infringing units, and finding that reasonable 
royalty rates averaged 13.1% of sales during their study period – well above the average 
profit margin of just 8.3%). 
96  For example, an unlocked iPhone 4S currently retails for almost $600, see 
http://www.amazon.com/Apple-iPhone-4S-16GB-Black/dp/B006FMDVDK, while the 
wireless chipset it includes costs about $6.50, see iPhone 4S Component Costs Once 
Again Begin at About $188, MACRUMORS, Oct. 20, 2011, at 
http://www.macrumors.com/2011/10/20/iphone-4s-component-costs-once-again-begin-at-
about-188/. 
97 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend 
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative 
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defendant bears the cost of defense, but shares the benefits of invalidating 
or narrowing a patent with all its competitors.  As a result, a customer 
defendant has less than socially-optimal incentive to litigate, and instead 
once sued actually has an incentive to see its competitors also bear the cost 
of a patent suit.  Accordingly, NPEs commonly kickoff a patent 
enforcement campaign by first targeting weak customer defendants in 
order to obtain favorable settlements or court victories that will set an 
initial “market price” for the patent moving forward. 98   Customer 
defendants are routinely complicit in this process and may, for example, 
willingly settle for an artificially high royalty rate applied to an artificially 
small quantity of sales in hopes that their competitors will later pay the 
same rate on all their revenue.99 
 
III. EXPANDING THE CUSTOMER SUIT EXCEPTION 
 
For all these reasons, the current test for applying the customer suit 
exception fails to consider the full range of costs of customer litigation and 
benefits of manufacturer litigation.  As a result, current caselaw fails to 
achieve a socially-optimal balance between patentees’ rights to enforce 
their patents and society’s interest in policing and properly valuing 
patented inventions.  Fortunately, existing doctrine is easily salvageable.  
Courts are looking in the right direction, but with an unduly narrow focus.  
                                                                                                                            
Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) (“[A] challenger 
bears the cost of litigation but its rivals and downstream buyers will capture almost all the 
benefits of successful challenge . . . .”). 
98 Settlement rates and reasonable royalty damages not only affect the parties involved in 
the litigation but also impact the entire industry.  A judicial finding of patent infringement, 
validity and damages has an enormous impact on the value of a patent and the royalties 
that may be collected by patent holders.  See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 80-81 (“The distribution of value 
of patents appears to be highly skewed, with the top 1% of patents more than a thousand 
times as valuable as the median patent.  Many patents are virtually worthless, either 
because they cover technology that is not commercially important, because they are 
impossible to enforce effectively, or because they are very unlikely to hold up if litigated 
and thus cannot be asserted effectively.”).  Favorable litigation outcomes often set the 
"market price" for the patent because potential infringers are deterred from challenging a 
patent that has been battle-tested.  See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 23, 
at *5 (“Small companies increase the returns to patent assertion when they legitimize 
PAE patents, regardless of their validity, by agreeing to royalty-based settlements.”). 
99  See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 23, at *5 (noting that “small 
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Accordingly, we recommend that courts expand existing doctrine as 
follows. 
First, we recommend that courts begin applying the customer suit 
exception (at least to a limited extent) on a patent-by-patent and 
manufacturer-by-manufacturer basis, rather than on a case-by-case basis.  
To do otherwise is to render the doctrine a virtual nullity.  Current 
caselaw limits the doctrine’s application to circumstances where customer 
defendants are “mere resellers” of the technology produced by one 
manufacturer. 100   As a result, the doctrine is easily circumvented by 
adding a customer-specific claim or suing a batch of customers who 
collectively use the technology of more than one manufacturer.101   
At a minimum, we suggest that courts apply the customer suit exception 
(i) when the patentee’s infringement allegations are primarily directed at a 
manufacturer’s technology and no more than nominally at technology 
added by the customer defendants themselves, and (ii) if customers of 
multiple manufacturers are joined, when there are no more than nominal 
questions of fact common to all customer defendants.  This proposed rule, 
which draws on traditional principles of “improper joinder”102 as well as 
new joinder rules applicable in patent suits following enactment of the 
America Invents Act, 103  would prevent patentees from strategically 
avoiding the doctrine by adding trivial customer-specific claims or claims 
against customers of other manufacturers, and would instead give courts 
discretion to apply the customer suit exception when doing so would 
clearly advance the interests of judicial economy.   
Second, we recommend that courts whether the exception will advance 
judicial economy in a particular case, consider more than just the short-
term consequences of such a ruling.  Current doctrine asks only whether 
applying the exception will reduce the number of already-filed suits, 
without regard to whether it might reduce the number of suits filed in the 
future.104  Instead, courts should take a broader view of judicial economy 
that additionally considers whether applying the exception will lead to 
                                                 
100 See supra note 54. 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., Salazar v. Allstate Texas Lloyd's, Inc., 455 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(“In the paradigmatic fraudulent joinder case, a plaintiff sues a nominal nondiverse/in-
state defendant along with a diverse foreign defendant in an effort to make sure that its 
claims against the diverse defendant stay in state court.”) 
103 See supra note 6. 
104 See supra note 53. 
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fewer case filings down the road.  In other words, courts should consider 
the nature of the litigation before them—i.e., whether or not it appears to 
be part of a large enforcement campaign against users of technology—and, 
thus, the likelihood that one (or even a small handful of) manufacturer 
suits will stop future suits from being filed or significantly reduce 
litigation costs by, for example, simplifying discovery.  Additionally, 
courts should consider whether applying the customer suit exception in the 
instant case is likely to deter other patentees from endeavoring to sue a 
multitude of customer defendants, when it would be possible to instead sue 
a solvent manufacturer. 
Finally, we recommend that courts add an additional factor to the test: 
rather than focusing exclusively on judicial economy, courts should 
additionally consider society’s interest in enforcing the quid pro quo 
underlying the patent system. 105   Specifically, courts should weigh the 
relative abilities of the manufacturer and customers involved in the instant 
suit to defend against the patentee’s claims.  This consideration should 
include the parties’ respective knowledge of and access to information 
relevant to the patent’s validity, the specific components or features 
accused of infringement, and the calculation of damages, including 




Nuisance value litigation harms everyone, and enriches no one, except 
those who pursue it.  With patent-fueled strike suits on the rise, and 
meaningful legislative reforms out of reach, courts and accused infringers 
need common law “self-help” solutions now more than ever. 106  
                                                 
105 See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi–Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 
(2001) (“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to 
exclude.’” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))); 
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo ... for granting 
a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial 
utility.”); Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 23 (1829) (noting that if an invention is already 
commonly known and used when a patent is sought, “there might be sound reason for 
presuming, that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right,” given the 
absence of a “quid pro quo.”). 
106 See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 325, 387-90 
(2012) (arguing that historical examples suggest that legislative efforts to reform the 
patent system generally fail, while “self-help” mechanisms like tacit industry-wide 
coordination against patent abuses have generally succeeded). 
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Fortunately, a promising solution has been lurking in the forgotten 
recesses of patent caselaw for decades.  Though unduly limited in its 
current incarnation, the customer suit exception is, in spirit, just what the 
patent system needs: a procedural vehicle that ensures the entity best 
suited to test a patent gets a shot at doing so.  Updating the doctrine to 
account for the complexity of modern technology might just be enough to 
stop the next Innovatio or Lodsys before it ever files a suit. 
